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Abstract 
Built on the perception of the bank’s employees in one of the Bulgarian banks placed under conservatorship in 2014, this study 
aims to identify the factors that appear to stimulate criminal activities in the banking industry. Following illegalities associated 
with the collapse of the fourth biggest bank in Bulgaria, this study examines the propensity to willful blindness. A survey was 
carried out by distributing questionnaires to all bank employees in addition to semi-structural interviews and ongoing media 
monitoring for the period of seven months. The findings reveal that bank criminal activities are mostly due to inadequate 
organizational culture, missing internal control, weak supervision performed by the central bank and lacking coherence among 
governmental authorities, including public prosecution. Although financial supervision as well as chartered accounting services 
needs more responsibility and control over bank activities, detecting willful blindness is the most important signal for corporate 
illegalities. The research outcome proves that anonymous questionnaires that contain no identifying information are more likely 
to produce evidences for discovering willful blindness among employees. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate wrongdoing appears to be a common occurrence in both emerging and developed markets. Most of the 
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cases reporting bankruptcies or failures possess a high level of political exposure. Academic researchers should do 
much more theoretical and empirical studies to be able to predict and avoid illegalities. Most researchers have 
investigated liquidity and profitability based on publicly available financial statements, statistics related to the 
industry or firm size, yet none of these factors could be recognized as a consistent predictor to corporate 
wrongdoing. 
Following the collapse of the fourth biggest bank in Bulgaria this article examines the level of willful blindness 
among bank employees into a related bank. Massive distribution of questionnaires in combination with semi-
structured interviews executed prior and after data collection proves the possibility to unveil realistic corporate 
realities. The uniqueness of the research are examining the perception of bank employees during the conservatorship 
period which lasts for six months. Probably this is one of the biggest conservatorship periods in the bank history, 
ended successfully with the bank returned to its normal operations. Having an ambition to avoid any political 
exposure, to keep the academic tone and neutral point of view, any names will be entirely omitted when replaced by 
labels such as: “Small Bank”, “Big Bank”, “Central Bank”, “Government” and “Public Prosecution”. 
2. Illegal Corporate Behavior 
Baucus (1994) describes illegal corporate behavior as intentional and unintentional wrongdoing that can occur 
through acts of commission or omission. The corporate crime can be considered intentional illegality. It differs from 
occupational crime, when professionals engage in illegal acts primarily for their-own personal gain. In the case of 
corporate illegality, the organization is the primary beneficiary. 
Mishina et.al (2010) explores cognitive biases and limitations shape top management team to engage directly in 
illegal actions and/or create the conditions that lead others to do so. Viewed from the willful blindness research, 
corporate illegalities represent unethical, unacceptable, impermissible violation of the law, established moral 
standards and ethics, with passive or active management participation, whether the acts are intentional or 
unintentional. The term “willful blindness” should be a legal principle stipulated in the modern law of a country. 
Currently it is particularly applicable to money laundering investigations, but also to scrutinize corporate illegalities. 
Legal practice defines “willful blindness” as the “deliberate avoidance of knowledge of the facts” or “purposeful 
indifference.” Willful blindness should be considered as equivalent to actual knowledge of the illegalities.  
Conservatorship is a legal concept stipulated in the Bulgarian banking law, where usually two guardians are 
appointed by the Central bank to manage the financial affairs and daily business of a bank in troubles. The 
maximum period for conservators to be in charge is limited to six months and it should be followed by syndic 
(trustees) in case of bankruptcy or liquidation. Executive directors replace conservators when the bank turns back to 
business.  
3. Method of study 
This study focuses on the context of the Bulgarian banking developments during the conservatorship period of 
the Small Bank that lasted for six months, plus an extra month in normal banking operations. Official press-releases 
issued by the Central Bank and publications in the business media have been analyzed and coded. Perception of the 
bank’s employees towards coded events, plus actual dynamics in the industry, has been studied via semi-structured 
interviews. The interviews were based on a framework developed prior to the data collection. Pilot interviews 
conveyed wording of the questions to be subsequently used in the questionnaire in purpose to clarify the level of 
understanding, spread and range of the queries. Final interviews followed collected questionnaires to reflect 
refinements in understanding and analyzing of willful blindness phenomena. 
Questionnaires containing 99 questions in addition to nine open-end questions and demographic data were 
delivered to every employee in the Small Bank, followed by five re-calling notices mentioning the value of 
participation. For a period of 45 days, every employee has equal access to fulfil the questionnaire namely or 
anonymously and to put it into especially devoted boxes, placed at the bank entrances or to reply electronically. 
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4. Results 
Table 1. Snapshot comparing different activities in the banks as remarked by the employees. 
Big Bank Small Bank 
Policies and Activities Before Conservatorship 
Growing an invisible conglomerate – acquiring some of the biggest 
and strategically important local companies 
Deposit concentration with limited number of affluent customers 
fascinated by the  owners’ name, credit rating and reputation 
Lucrative interest rates on deposits for all Favoritism to some customers and employees 
Attracting public money – deposits from municipalities, hospitals, 
state-companies 
Dubious branch expansion mixing expenses for rent, reconstruction 
and cleaning 
Formation of a systemic bank Non-performing loans – from something to nothing, but cheeky 
explanations by counsel 
Findings During Conservatorship 
Assets have puzzling values as related to investment banking and 
project financing 
Assets have clear value based on retail banking principles and blue 
cheeps firms 
IT system – local and tailor-made IT system dependent on the mother bank 
Expenses exacerbated towards political exposed persons and media 
aiming lobbyism 
Expenses exacerbated towards suppliers and landlords 
Extreme cash transaction (EUR 103M) withdrawn by the owner a 
day before ending 
Duality in the legal counsel’s opinions 
Discovered “creative” accounting policies resulted in capital 
increases 
Some key employees have family connections with local political 
elite 
Activities During Conservatorship 
“Good” bank / “Bad” bank debate Rebranding 
Doubt on the recoverability of loans Pressure group from suppliers 
Reduction of interest rates on deposits Pressure group from customers 
Puzzling communication with owner, potential investors and EU 
authorities 
Boycott of employees in purpose to preserve status quo 
License have been revoked New treatment for NPLs 
Cessions and netting – borrowers buy deposits (usually at a very 
high discount) to re-pay their obligations toward the bank 
Selling loan portfolios to three banks, as follows: SMEs at 95%; 
mortgages at 100% and consumer loans with mortgage at 102%  
Repayment of guaranteed deposits performed by the deposit 
insurance fund via nine banks 
Back to normal operations without public support 
After Conservatorship 
Fine art painting and jewelry moved from Big Bank premises to a 
museum 
New board of directors appointed 
Initiated bankruptcy to key debtors Closure of excessive branches 
Change in legislation to appoint a syndic Arrangements to independent IT system  
 
Recent Bulgarian history demonstrates that bankruptcy is the only occurrence after conservatorship. However, 
troubles with the Big Bank are the first case when a systemic bank enters into difficulties. This is the reason Table 1 
to expose a snapshot comparing different activities in the banks as remarked by the employees. 
4.1. Perception of Employees 
Despite global financial crisis most of the experts believed that the Bulgarian banking system was stable and 
solvent (Sotirova, 2012). Data provided in Table 2 perfectly illustrate the outcome when the Big Bank, similar to 
other local banks, gradually conquered market positions from the subsidiaries of the foreign banks, like from the 
Small Bank. The real mechanism of feeding fuzzy conglomerates linked to the local banks’ owners stays beyond the 
numbers.  
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Table 2. Dynamics in total assets (TA) and net results (NR) as of the respective year-end (YE). (*) Big bank’s outcome stays outside industry 
results for YE2014. 
 YE 2014* YE 2013 YE 2008 YE 2003 
In million BGN TA NR TA NR TA NR TA NR 
Big Bank 1 835 -4 267 6 740 71 2 106 40 297 2.9 
Small Bank 195 -14.9 407 -14.7 470 -3 84 0.3 
TOTAL BANKING 85 135 746 85 747 585 69 551 1 388 17 324 380 
Although thought-provoking data presented in Table 1 trigger several illustrations for wrongdoings, many 
experienced banking professionals stay distant from the ambitions of the new rich (Kostova, 2013). The 
questionnaire distributed among the professionals in the Small Bank addresses employees perception towards cases 
of neglecting professional matters and fear suppressed communication. The existence of the willful blindness as a 
pre - condition for corporate illegality is the main hypothesis behind the wording of questions and the purpose of 
collecting data via such an extensive questionnaire.  
Demographic data shows that around 20% of the total number of the bank employees in Small Bank fulfilled the 
questionnaire. Two thirds replied anonymously while one third stated his exact name and address. Proportionally the 
number of females was three times bigger than the number of male respondents. The typical respondents were 
women with family and kids, working in the banking industry for more than 10 years and in the Small Bank 
between two to five years. 
A very clear result from answers listed in the Table 3 suggests that the biggest difference is between anonymous 
and named replies on questions related to money laundering (89), immediately followed by “adjusted” replies 
related to assessment on relationships between an employee and his/her direct superior (30,33,83). Next to the 
organizational hierarchy is the employees’ self-assessment related to their success, sexual relationships and internal 
favoritism (questions with original numbers 94, 13, 26 and 32). Practically there is no reported difference between 
anonymous and named replies on neutral questions as related to the team structure, the general ban for illegalities 
and external favoritism, when it is not related to personal gains (questions 28,58,93). 
 
Table 3. Questions wording with the original number of the question. Applied Agree/Disagree response scale with 1 as “Strongly Disagree” and 7 
as “Strongly Agree”. Outcome identified with an arithmetic average and mode. Replies labeled as: (a) – anonymous, (n) – named, (t) – total. 
 
QN Questions Wording 
Average Mode 
a n t a n t 
3 I receive knowledge and support needed to improve performance  4.19 4.77 4.38 6 3 6 
5 We have fair and honest assessments on employees 4.04 3.46 3.85 5 4 5 
8 This organization supports team work 4.19 3.77 4.05 5 3 5 
11 I trust this organization offers to me sufficient range of professional opportunities 4.12 3.54 3.92 5 5 5 
13 Possible intimate relationships between colleagues can assist teamwork  3.27 2.46 3.00 4 1 4 
19 I will support a colleague even he/she is doing something illegal 2.38 2.46 2.41 2 1 1 
26 All in the Bank clearly understand our customers’ needs and expectations 4.73 4.00 4.49 6 5 5 
28 Some colleagues provide special treatment to some customers /Favoritism/ 4.54 4.54 4.54 4 4 4 
30 My direct superior treats all his subordinates fairly. 4.46 5.85 4.92 5 7 5 
32 Management shows different proximity to coworkers /Favoritism/ 4.65 5.23 4.85 4 7 4 
33 My direct superior is always consistent, when applying human resource policies 4.46 5.54 4.82 5 7 5 
56 There are colleagues who violates bank rules and regulations 4.73 4.69 4.72 5 4 5 
57 My colleagues take care for me as for a friend  4.96 5.08 5.00 5 5 5 
58 My colleagues will stop me if I try to do something illegal 4.92 4.92 4.92 4 4 4 
59 Bank possesses adequate systems to effectively prevent losses and/or fraud. 4.96 4.54 4.82 6 5 6 
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66 There are colleagues who spread rumors and false allegations 5.12 5.00 5.08 4 4 4 
67 If management suspects that a colleague violates the rules of the Bank, I will do 
everything possible to convince them that my colleague is innocent. 
3.85 4.23 3.97 3 4 4 
69 This organization has an environment to support information and knowledge sharing 3.42 3.31 3.38 5 2 2 
70 This organization encourages truth and honest communication 3.92 3.85 3.90 5 3 5 
79 I know a colleague who reveals bank’s inside information to an outside party 3.08 2.46 2.87 4 1 4 
82 I know a colleague who has taken a bribe or received a personal gain 2.69 2.15 2.51 4 1 1 
83 My direct supervisor has never taken a bribe and did not received personal gain 4.69 5.69 5.03 4 7 4 
89 I have witnessed money laundering 4.12 2.54 3.59 4 1 1 
91 If I am doing wrong, I trust it will be a colleague who will share responsibility for my 
mistake. 
3.15 3.54 3.28 4 3 4 
93 I am working with colleagues, who I know for more than five years 4.46 4.46 4.46 7 1 7 
94 I trust in my success! 5.42 6.38 5.74 6 6 6 
96 I believe the quality of the judicial system in Bulgaria improves 2.77 2.62 2.72 3 2 3 
98 If I have an issue with a client or a colleague in the bank, I can whisper about the 
problem to an outside party 
3.08 2.62 2.92 3 2 2 
99 My opinion matters and my ideas definitely considered 4.23 5.00 4.49 5 5 5 
 
Similar outcome comes when measuring correlation between replies. About 55 meaningful correlations were 
found among anonymous replies, while there are only 30 in the total set.  
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When the further research need to set thresholds, and so to diagnose the exact level of willful blindness in one 
organization, the correlation between money laundering and external favoritism should be considered as an 
important factor (correlation of 42% between questions 28 and 89 in Table 4). External and internal favoritism show 
correlation of 53% (questions 28 and 32). Permissiveness to sexual relationships is materially correlated to the 
violence of the banking rules (51% in question 13 and 56). Spreading rumors against the bank and management 
have not been an exceptional event during the conservatorship period; this is the reason to stress on negative 
correlation between questions 66 and 70 and also between questions 66 and 98.  
Several important elements, which we witnessed during the studied period, were debated during the interviews, 
but it remains outside our research. Public prosecution, central bank and governmental authorities should address 
important issues, such as the one whispered by the Chairmen of the Banking Association on December 4th, 2014, as 
the Big Bank was sacrificed under the South Stream pipeline project, especially following the sanctions list in the 
wake of the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Obviously, the answers to these questions should not be searched 
among bank employees. However, a clear consensus as related to the quality of the Bulgarian judicial system was 
given by answers to the question 96 (see Table 3). 
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5. Conclusion 
The aim of this article has been to analyze and discuss how corporate wrongdoing can best be predicted by 
studying willful blindness. Our main focus has been on the illegalities related to the failure of the fourth biggest 
bank in Bulgaria. To understand the mechanisms that caused such a financial turmoil, we have studied the 
combination of business media publications, press-releases of the Central Bank and employees’ perceptions. In 
contrary to many academic studies, years of mainstream credit expansion does not affect financial situations in the 
studied banks. Disinvestment strategies implemented by international banks, stimulated local banks in building 
excessive conglomerate structures. Immature political system, weak supervision performed by the central bank and 
lacking coherence among governmental authorities, including public prosecution resulted in acceleration of bank 
panic followed by the failure of a systemic bank. Having a very imperfect judicial system, there is little doubt that a 
decision for bank closure serves borrowers not to repay their debts and it is still more fueling corruption.  
On the level of bank employees, the analysis reveals a clear link between willful blindness and corporate 
illegalities. We consider that willful blindness could not be only an isolated case of a defendant, but also part of 
organizational behavior inside an institution. Our analysis demonstrates that the longer the conservatorship period, 
the lower the chances for the bank to come back to business. It is the reason conservatorship should be established 
for a very short, transitional period. Defendant, passive and unclear positions articulated by the Central bank results 
by implementing sub-optimal solutions for banking stability and business sustainability. Further research needs to 
analyze the effects of enhanced banking concentration towards corporate governance, compliance and access to 
credit. 
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